This article seeks to add to the exploration and development of Imperial History's contribution to the discipline of International Relations (IR). Focusing on British perceptions of Afghanistan in the period preceding the first Anglo-Afghan war the article considers colonial knowledge as a source of identity construction, but in a manner that avoids deploying anachronistic concepts, in this case that of the Afghan 'state'. This approach, which draws on the insights brought to IR by historical sociology, shows that engaging with Imperial History within IR can encourage a more reflexive attitude to core disciplinary categories. This not only reveals alternative approaches to the construction of specific political communities but it also allows for a more historicist mode in the use of history by IR as a discipline. Furthermore, by moving away from material based purely on diplomatic history, Afghanistan's imperial
encounter can be recovered from the dominance of 'Great Game' narratives, offering an account that is more appreciative of the Afghanistan context.
In January 2002, barely two months after Operation Enduring Freedom had toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the former soldier, diplomat, and now Conservative MP Rory Stewart walked across Afghanistan, following in the footsteps of the Mogul Emperor Babur the Great. The title he chose for the work that followed the journey was The Places In Between, i a reflection perhaps, of the enduring tendency to view Afghanistan as at the confluence of the 'knowable' -of civilizations, empires, nationstates, or societies -and yet paradoxically resembling a land of the 'unknowable', of 'wild tribes', nefarious actors; a domain of rumour, intrigue, and violence.
ii As a former history tutor at Balliol College Oxford, Stewart was certainly aware that by making his trip he was also following in the footsteps of a collection of nineteenth century explorers -themselves often scholars, soldiers, and diplomats -all seeking to uncover this mysterious location 'in between' the imperial interests of British India, and Imperial
Russia.
iii As with Stewart, these individuals produced works, and in some cases, provided the advice for policy makers as they sought to devise an effective foreign policy on India's northwest frontier.
iv
The significance of this nineteenth-century colonial quest for knowledge of Afghanistan, and its relevance to the political decisions that were taken, has often been overlooked as a result of the more dramatic story of Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia; the so-called 'Great Game'. Commonly this quest is simply portrayed as a story of the swashbuckling adventures of a nascent colonial intelligence community, combating the spread of Russian influence. v But as Benjamin Hopkins has shown, this was 'far from the only, nor even the most important' story at this time. vi The problem here is not one of fact, but of emphasis.
In this article I aim to make two main contributions. Firstly, I seek to add to the development, and the exploration of, imperial history's contribution to the discipline of International Relations (IR). In particular the article considers colonial knowledge as a source of identity construction for the colonial state, and therefore providing a line of enquiry for contemporary IR theorists. But I seek to do so in a manner that avoids deploying anachronistic concepts, in this case that of the Afghan 'state'. vii This approach, which draws on the insights brought to IR by historical sociology, shows that engaging with imperial history within IR can encourage a more reflexive attitude to core disciplinary categories. This not only offers insights into the construction of specific political communities but it also allows for a more historicist mode in the use of history by IR as a discipline. The need for this approach within IR is an argument frequently made, but less frequently carried out. viii Secondly, and to this end, I seek to contribute to the growing literature that seeks to recover Afghanistan's imperial encounter. ix The common refrain that the British knew nothing of Afghanistan prior to the First Anglo-Afghan war needs revision. But more importantly, the article seeks to provide an alternative narrative to the traditional focus on geopolitics and grand strategy -a bias which is itself a reflection of the tendency for international history to focus on diplomatic sources to the detriment of more local or 'on the ground' accounts.
x By drawing on a sociology of knowledge approach, the article charts the emergence of a set of criteria that provided a degree of legibility for policymakers, and in turn helped to order their policy prescriptions. Based on the observation that knowledge is in part a 'participation in the cultural resources of society' xi this provides a more cultural basis for foreign policy decision making, but one which is inherently tied up in the process of interaction: of knowledge 'becoming' so, rather than simply 'being '. xii The analysis focuses on the activities, correspondence and texts of a select group of itinerant explorers, military men, archaeologists, adventurers, and quasi-official East India Company representatives. Whilst initially uncoordinated, these individuals, I
argue, began to resemble a 'knowledge community' through their correspondence and through the pooling of their work by an increasingly interested policy elite. Ultimately this knowledge community would contribute to the decision to launch an invasion of Afghanistan in 1838 in order to depose the ruler Dost Muhammad Khan for the preferred former-King Shah Shuja ul-Mulk. This community therefore created the groundwork for the emergence of the idea of Afghanistan in the imperial mind, as well as the foundations for policy prescriptions, and would leave an indelible mark on British conceptualizations of the Afghan strategic space. This 'imperial turn' has yielded some fruitful returns. Jordan Branch has shown how the spread of the territorial state was not simply the exporting of Eurocentric constructs of sovereign authority, but rather a process of 'colonial reflection' whereby colonial officials unfamiliar with local spatialities of power and authority were forced to rely on a more intelligible 'scientific' approach through cartography -a method that was then imported back to Europe. xxvi Edward Keene, through his reframing of Grotius' work has highlighted how the concept of 'divided sovereignty' -the idea that sovereignty could be shared by two powers -provided theoretical justification for imperialist ventures throughout the nineteenth century. xxvii Meanwhile Gerry Simpson -although not focusing exclusively on empire -has nonetheless shown how during the nineteenth century imperial entities were responsible for the construction of a legal framework that institutionalized a form of 'legal hegemony' and 'anti-pluralism'; one that mandated distinctions between 'Great Powers' and 'outlaw states', a distinction that he argues has left a legacy to this day. xxviii Imperial history provides a reminder of the historical contingency of core categories whose ontological stability is often taken for granted.
Imperial history, IR, and historical sociology
Equally, it shows that these categories were continually contested, not just within imperial political thought, but in the process of global exchange, of which imperialism was simply one variant. In short, the constitutive effects of imperial exchange are often overlooked by an IR discipline that remains analytically imprisoned by its own theorydriven orthodoxies. the practical suggestion that 'common-sense 'knowledge' rather than 'ideas' must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge' xxxv Whilst I agree with these sentiments, the role of 'thought' in the systematization of information, does make it necessary to refer to the deeper intellectual currents -often in the form that could be loosely referred to as 'ideas' -in order to contextualize that which passes for knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is in part a 'participation in the cultural resources of society'. Thirdly, despite the apparent and actual projection of culturally-rooted, intellectual trends, and representations onto the Afghan space, this form of knowledge capture and sequestering should not be misinterpreted as a one-way process from metropole to periphery, or as an imperialist imposition of Eurocentric categories onto a nonEuropean space. This was certainly part of the story, but as more recent work (at least since the late 1990s) on this aspect of imperial history has shown has shown, imperial expansion, including practices of knowledge procurement, also involved exchange and interaction both within and between imperial territories, peripheries, and elsewhere. Between this core group of actors, we see in the archives therefore, the emergence not just of a knowledge community, but increasingly a policy community. Whilst the transition between these two cognitive realms is necessary to understanding how knowledge of Afghanistan guided policy, it is to the content of this knowledge that we turn to next.
Knowing Afghanistan as a political community
Whilst it is important not to create an undue sense of commonality between the works of the early European explorers of Afghanistan there are nonetheless some similarities. Through conjectural history the development of a political community was often viewed through these accounts as the history of the rise of one elite group over another. When it came to interacting with these communities the British were therefore crafting their own structures of significance, interpreted through their own culturally located intellectual understandings.
Despite these similarities important differences between these works should be 
I. Bounding Afghanistan
If as Benedict Anderson has argued, the nation is an 'imagined community', then we should not be surprised at multiple, competing definitions of Afghan nationhood. Such cartographic representations of the region appear to demonstrate a failure on the part of the British to comprehend the reality of facts on the ground, but in truth the British were well aware of the ambiguity of territory in the region. The frontier of the British Empire did not end with a line on the map, but rather faded out as influence became more tenuous, and knowledge more sparse. Indeed British diplomatic and commercial engagement in the region, including overseeing treaty negotiations, and mediating between warring parties can be seen as a partly a process of formalizing and apportioning territorial limits and possessions. A process that was also underway in India, which itself remained territorially and politically ill-defined. In the areas inhabited by 'Afghans' however, British involvement was far more limited, and thus contributed to a sense of unease with what 'Afghanistan' meant in territorial terms. In effect, this territorial ambiguity was the manifestation of competing notions of sovereignty between colonial and Afghan understandings, an ambiguity that disturbs the more rigid understandings of sovereignty familiar to IR. This ambiguity was clear in the forms of political authority that Elphinstone identified.
II. Authority, state, and tribe
For Elphinstone, royal authority in Afghanistan was the hereditary preserve of the Saddozai sub-tribe of the Durrani tribal federation. He identified the principal function of the government apparatus to be that of deriving revenue, the main source of which was from land tenure, with the main expenses of the court being the payment of the army, the household, the court establishment, and the clergy. technology that it was hoped would benefit communications, trade, and security across the British territories. xc To this end, in 1837 Alexander Burnes, along with three EIC officials, was sent on a second surveying mission to assess the commercial viability of the Indus River and the prospects of trade with Kabul. Burnes' trip therefore satisfied the dual purposes of a commercial urge, and a desire for accurate political intelligence.
The result was a far more policy-driven development of existing knowledge, the output of which went directly to the Governor-General, who as late as 1837 was lamenting the 'haze of confusion' that existed beyond Lahore. The development of what has been termed a 'knowledge community' on Afghanistan was a manifestation of an evolving approach to the collection and use of colonial knowledge more widely by the colonial state. In the case of Afghanistan, the use of this knowledge in framing the policies that led to the First Anglo-Afghan War, shut down the latitude and fluidity that was previously apparent in existing understandings of the Afghan polity, including competing sovereign orders, and the vaguaries of Afghanistan's territorial reach. The knowledge community provided two principal ways through which the British could 'imagine' Afghanistan. On the one hand it provided evidence for a fractured, acephalous polity, at war with itself, unbounded, volatile and inadequately led by a 'chief', who had usurped the legitimate ruling dynasty and now threatened neighbouring powers in order to compensate for his own internal weakened rulership. This picture was heightened by the contrasting features of the polities -even 'states' -surrounding Afghanistan that were apparently more bounded, stable, unified, monarchical authorities with whom the British could more easily conduct diplomatic and commercial exchanges. The difficulties that the British faced in scrutinizing and categorizing Afghanistan -'a country which', as Burnes described it, 'seemed as it were not' -meant that the territory became more of a locational concept, continually contested in the imperial mind. cx The march to war in 1838 forced a process of closure over this definition. The second contribution made by the knowledge community was in providing an alternative scenario: reinstating the deposed Saddozai authority, under Shah Shuja, who could rectify the failings of the collapsed polity the British now believed they were seeing beyond the Indus river.
Ultimately the knowledge community that grew up around the policy problem of British India's northwest provided the sources for justifying a policy of conquest, and left an intellectual legacy that outlasted its relevance. The failure of the project to consolidate Rescuing Afghanistan's imperial encounter from the oblivion of great power diplomatic history demands closer attention to the sunken histories of this period. Imperial histories have for some time moved on from the sterile categories of official practice and instead embraced social, cultural and intellectual history to thicken their narratives and to give voice to the voiceless. Whilst the 'imperial turn' in IR has created space for the incorporation of such work into the discipline, there is much left to explore. In arguing for greater attention to colonial knowledge in particular this article has sought to conduct IR in the imperial mode, in a way that does not do damage to either the history, or to the insights that IR can bring to the 
